The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun\u27s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom by Caldwell, Harry M. & Chase, Carol A.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 78
Issue 1 Fall 1994 Article 3
The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice
Blackmun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of
Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects
Outside the Courtroom
Harry M. Caldwell
Carol A. Chase
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Harry M. Caldwell and Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding Justice Blackmun's Call to Examine the Rule in Light of
Changing Judicial Understanding About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 45 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol78/iss1/3
THE UNRULY EXCLUSIONARY RULE:
HEEDING JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S
CALL TO EXAMINE THE RULE IN
LIGHT OF, CHANGING JUDICIAL
UNDERSTANDING ABOUT ITS EFFECTS
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM
HARRY M. CALDWELL*
CAROL A. CHASE**
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a war raging in the hearts and minds of most Americans over
the efficacy of the American Criminal Justice system. Americans are
concerned with rising crime and they sense that the criminal justice sys-
tem is not adequately protecting them from crime or criminals. If
pressed to identify a focal point of criticism of the justice system, many
would name the Exclusionary Rule. The Rule is popularly believed to
exclude even the most damning evidence for the slightest police error.
Whether it is due to the disproportionality of the Rule's operation, or
the fact that it simply does not work as originally intended, the judicially
crafted Exclusionary Rule is under fire.
Does it make sense that "the criminal is to go free because the con-
stable has blundered?"1 Does it make sense to exclude evidence gath-
ered against an accused if the police have engaged in an unreasonable
search and seizure? Is this the necessary price society must pay to en-
sure the integrity of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unrea-
sonable search and seizure?
This article will take a hard look at the American Exclusionary Rule
and will address several questions. First, what costs does the Rule im-
pose upon the American criminal justice system and citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights? Second, is the Rule accomplishing what it was origi-
nally intended to accomplish, specifically, the deterrence of future illegal
police conduct? Third, does the Rule need to be re-designed, or even
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of their research assistants Joanne Kuhns and
Dennis Bishop.
1. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
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replaced, to better meet the competing demands of protecting Fourth
Amendment rights and convicting criminals?
This article first looks at the Exclusionary Rule, beginning with its
inception in Weeks v. U.S.2 and Mapp v. Ohio,3 through its most current
applications. From that vantage point, the benefits and costs of the Rule
are examined in light of its goal of deterring future illegal police activity.
Then, with an eye toward not succumbing to the ethnocentricity of the
American experience, the article looks outside the United States and
examines the rules established in other common law countries regarding
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the laws of those coun-
tries. Finally, drawing from the avowed purpose of the Rule and from an
international perspective, this article will offer proposals to the Ameri-
can justice system for a better method to accomplish its goal of deterring
future illegal government conduct while avoiding the tremendous social,
political, and economic costs attributed to the present Exclusionary
Rule.
II. THE, AMERICAN APPROACH TO THB ExCLusIONARY RULE
A. The American Exclusionary Rule
Between 1791 and 1914, the constitutionally guaranteed right of all
citizens to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures re-
mained virtually unenforced by American courts. The Fourth Amend-
ment had the words that warned the government not to engage in
unreasonable searches and seizures, but lacked any means to restrain
government officials from violating citizens' Fourth Amendment rights.
Not until 1914 in Weeks v. United States,4 did the U.S. Supreme Court
recognize that if evidence can be illegally obtained "and used in evi-
dence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment... is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution."' Thus,
the United States faced the problem that, while the Fourth Amendment
guaranteed protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
judicial system, as the primary protector of constitutional rights, did
nothing to deter or punish unreasonable searches and seizures.
To give value to the Fourth Amendment protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Weeks, held that
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. Id at 393.
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the Federal government and its agencies could not use illegally obtained
evidence against the accused at trial. In other words, the Court estab-
lished an exclusionary rule that illegally obtained evidence is inadmissi-
ble at trial and applied it only to the Federal courts.6 The Court
propounded two central rationales for its adoption of the Exclusionary
Rule. First, there was the need to protect citizens' Fourth Amendment
rights by deterring government conduct that violated those rights.7 Sec-
ond, there was the need to preserve the integrity of the judicial system
by refusing to sanction illegal police conduct: "To sanction such proceed-
ings [where illegally obtained evidence is admitted] would be to affirm
by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the peo-
ple against such unauthorized action."'
While Weeks represented a significant development in enforcing
Fourth Amendment rights, its limitation to federal courts greatly re-
stricted the Rule's ability to enforce those rights.
Four decades later, in Mapp v. Ohio,9 three police officers invaded
Dollree Mapp's home. The officers knocked on her door and demanded
entry. They suspected that someone they wanted to question was hiding
inside. Mapp consulted her lawyer and refused to admit the officers.
Later that day, four or more officers arrived at the home, which was still
under surveillance by the original officers. The officers then finally and
forcibly entered Mapp's home. About that time, Mapp's lawyer arrived
at the home but was not permitted to see his client or to enter her house.
Confronting the officers in her home, Mapp demanded to see their
search warrant. After Mapp grabbed the purported warrant and placed
it in her bosom, the officers forcibly recovered it from her. Mapp's arms
were grabbed, twisted, forced into handcuffs, and she was dragged to her
bedroom where she was forced to remain. The officers searched the en-
tire floor, including Mapp's bedroom and the basement of her home.
The officers found incriminating obscene materials and she was con-
victed of possession. Whether the officers had secured a warrant to
search Mapp's home was subject to "considerable doubt," and no such
warrant was produced at any subsequent legal proceeding.10 Given the
particularly egregious nature of the police misconduct, the Supreme
Court felt compelled to bestow teeth to the Fourth Amendment by mak-
6. Id at 398 (where said rule only applies to federal courts).
7. Id at 393.
8. Id at 394.
9. 367 U.S. 643.
10. Id at 645.
1994]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ing the Exclusionary Rule, first enunciated in Weeks, applicable to the
states.
In holding the Exclusionary Rule applicable to both state and federal
courts, the Mapp Court decided to "close the only courtroom door re-
maining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant
abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee
against that very same unlawful conduct."'" As in Weeks, the Mapp
Court reiterated that without the Exclusionary Rule, the use of illegally
obtained evidence to convict criminal defendants "tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the
people rest.' 12
Mapp reiterated the dual rationales enunciated in Weeks: protection
of citizens' Fourth Amendment rights, and preservation of judicial integ-
rity. 3 These dual rationales actually comprise only one justification be-
hind The Exclusionary Rule: the recognition that allowing unrestricted
use of illegally obtained evidence will not discourage violation of the
constitutionally protected right. It is evident that the true aim of the
Exclusionary Rule is to deter future police violation of constitutionally
protected rights. Specifically, excluding evidence illegally obtained will
chasten the government official to the extent that he or she will not en-
gage in similar conduct in the future. It is implicit that if the offending
government official would not be deterred from future illegality, then
application of the Rule would be inappropriate. Indeed, in a series of
cases after Mapp, the Supreme Court held the Rule's application inap-
propriate where the exclusion would not deter future Fourth Amend-
ment violations.
In United States v. Calandra,4 the Court declined to allow grand jury
witnesses to refuse to answer questions based upon evidence illegally
seized because the "incremental deterrent effect which might be
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at
best.""5 In United States v. Janis,6 the Court permitted the use of evi-
dence seized illegally by state officials in federal civil proceedings be-
cause the illegal conduct was not likely to be deterred by exclusion in
that setting. 7 The Court cited two factors which made exclusion unnec-
11. Id. at 654-55.
12. Id. at 660.
13. Id.
14. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
15. Id. at 351.
16. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
17. Id. at 454.
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essary in the Janis case.18 First, since the evidence was suppressed in the
state criminal trial, the officer had already been "punished" for violating
the Fourth Amendment.' 9 Second, since the evidence was also excluda-
ble at the federal criminal trial, the entire criminal enforcement process,
which was the concern and duty of these officers, would be frustrated by
the exclusion of the evidence in both proceedings.2 0 Thus, the Exclu-
sionary Rule accomplished its intended goal of deterrence in the crimi-
nal courts, and any further possible deterrent effect that exclusion from
federal civil proceedings might cause would be outweighed by the socie-
tal costs imposed by the exclusion.2 ' More recently, in United States v.
Leon,' the Court found the Rule's application inapplicable when police
officers reasonably relied on a search warrant.23 Since the constitutional
error in Leon was made by the magistrate in approving the search war-
rant, there was no police illegality and hence nothing to deter.24 Fur-
thermore, the Court held that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant
to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in
those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the
Exclusionary Rule.25 Leon is a powerful mandate holding that judges
should not exclude evidence unless exclusion would deter future illegal
police conduct.
Therefore, it is beyond dispute that the Exclusionary Rule, and the
focus of modern Supreme Court opinions construing the Exclusionary
Rule, is the preservation of our constitutional rights through the deter-
rence of future police misconduct that violates those rights.
B. The Costs of the Exclusionary Rule
Let there be no question that the costs of the Exclusionary Rule are
high. The costs run the gamut, from lost prosecutions, to public hostility
directed at the entire criminal justice system, to monetary burdens due
to the increased cost of litigation, to occasional police coverups for their
misconduct, and finally to the prostituting impact the Rule has on the
Fourth Amendment.
18. Id. at 448.
19. IM.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 454.
22. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 920-21.
25. Id. at 918.
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1. Lost or Inefficient Prosecution
Operation of the Exclusionary Rule bestows an unwarranted and un-
desirable benefit upon persons engaged in allegedly criminal activity.
One jurist, commenting upon the "perversity"2 6 of the Exclusionary
Rule because it punishes vigorous police work while it frees criminals,
allowing them to continue their criminal activity, wrote:
It has been reported that since 1961, when [Mapp was decided,]
... "the murder rate has doubled, rape has quadrupled and rob-
bery has quintupled." While it would be foolish to blame the ex-
clusionary rule [sic] for all of this alarming increase in violent
crime, I believe it is equally foolish to pretend that the exclusion-
ary rule, and the zeitgeist it has created, is to blame for none of
it. 2 7
Although reliable empirical data concerning the effects of the Exclusion-
ary Rule is sparse, a 1971 study by the General Accounting Office indi-
cates that suppression motions based upon the Exclusionary Rule are
fied in 10.5% of federal criminal cases, and that between 80 and 90% of
those motions are denied.38 The study further shows that the success-
fully excluded evidence under the Rule resulted in dismissals or acquit-
tals in only about half of those cases.29 Only 0.7% of federal criminal
defendants are being freed as a result of the application of the Exclu-
sionary Rule.3 0 This statistic may lead one to conclude that the "cost" of
the Exclusionary Rule, in terms of criminals going free, is not high.
However, such a conclusion ignores the hidden costs of the Exclusionary
Rule.
In addition to the 0.7% of all defendants who receive the ultimate
windfall from the Exclusionary Rule, many more defendants receive less
substantial but still significant benefits from the Exclusionary Rule. If
eighty to ninety percent of all suppression motions are denied, there is a
strong indication that too many meritless motions are being fied. This
phenomena is a result of the defendant's strategic use of the Exclusion-
ary Rule. These strategies may include the use of the motion as a bar-
gaining chip in plea bargaining or the use of the motion to wear down
26. United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990)(Bowman, J., concurring).
27. Id. (quoting Crack, Murder and Miranda, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1990 at A14)[citations
omitted].
28. U.S. Comptroller Gen., U.S. Acct. Off. Report to Congress. Impact of the Exclusion-
ary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 8, 10 (1979)[hereinafter GAO Study]. This study
was based upon data from 42 United States Attorneys Offices. Id. at 1.
29. Id. at 9-11.
30. Id.
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the prosecution team. Further, the filing of these motions is encouraged
because the cost to the defendant of doing so is slight compared to the
huge windfall benefit to be gained if the motion succeeds. This creates
an incentive to file even a motion that is unlikely to succeed. Thus, crim-
inal defendants without viable claims under the Exclusionary Rule may
benefit from strategic options available as a result of the Rule's exist-
ence. This is certainly an unwanted and costly effect of the Exclusionary
Rule.
Similarly, another hidden cost of the Exclusionary Rule is the loss of
prosecutions before formal charges are even filed because the prosecut-
ing agency knows that a criminal investigation is tainted by a Fourth
Amendment violation. Although the GAO Study suggested that only
.4% of federal criminal cases studied were declined for prosecution due
to search and seizure problems,31 another study conducted by the Na-
tional Institute of Justice found that 4.8% of all felony arrests were re-
jected for prosecution because of search problems.32 However, that
study also revealed that one prosecuting agency, the Los Angeles Dis-
trict Attorney's Office, rejected 32.5% of all felony narcotics cases due
to search problems.33 While this lack of prosecution may prevent the
expenditure of scarce resources on doomed prosecutions, the result is
again that suspected criminals are freed without being charged or tried
for any offense. Again, the defendant benefits from the Rule before it is
even applied to any evidence.
While the general public may or may not be aware of these indirect
benefits that the Exclusionary Rule provides for defendants, the public
seems to be extremely aware that the Exclusionary Rule frees some
criminals. Regardless of the actual statistics, the public perceives the ex-
clusion of evidence in criminal trials as a regular occurrence.34
2. Public Hostility Towards the Criminal Justice System.
Many Americans reject the idea that "the criminal is to go free be-
cause the constable has blundered. ' 35 Public hostility arises from more
than the fact that the Rule impedes the process of punishing some guilty
31. GAO Study, supra note 27, at 1.
32. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusionary
Rule: A Study in California 1 (1982).
33. Id. at 2.
34. See e.g., Diane Camper, A Rule Police Can Live With, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1979, at 86.
35. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 75, 77 (1992) (quoting People v.
Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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people. The disparity in particular cases between the police error com-
mitted and the windfall received by the alleged criminal is an affront to
popular ideas of justice. The public perceives the Rule as a device used
by cunning defense lawyers to suppress evidence no matter how slight
the police error and no matter how crucial the evidence is to the convic-
tion of a criminal the public thinks is guilty of heinous crimes. Yet, the
primary reason for the high price of the Rule is that, by definition, it
operates only after obtaining incriminating evidence. As a result, it
flaunts the public costs for Fourth Amendment guarantees, and in the
eyes of the public, it makes a mockery of the American justice system.
3. Monetary Burdens on the Criminal Justice System.
Perhaps a more significant cost of the Exclusionary Rule is the in-
crease in litigation expenses directly attributable to the motions to sup-
press-that, as stated above, are filed in 10.5% of criminal trials and
that, in many cases, may be meritless.36 These motions are supported by
costly briefs from both sides, and followed by the suppression hearing,
which is usually a full-blown evidentiary hearing that is costly in terms of
court time, attorney time, and witness time. For example, the highly
publicized O.J. Simpson pre-trial suppression hearing cost about $4,483
per day.37 Furthermore, the exclusion or inclusion of evidence fre-
quently becomes an appellate issue that further takes up court time with
briefs and oral arguments on these evidentiary issues. Thus, in terms of
attorney and court costs to the criminal justice systems, the motions are
costly regardless of their ultimate success.
4. Illegal Police Activity to Cover-up Illegal Police Activity
Police officers have an incentive to commit peijury or, at a minimum,
to carefully tailor the description of their investigative activities in order
to uphold the legality of their searches and seizures. In particular depart-
ments, officers of the court have observed patterns of pervasive police
perjury that are intended to avoid the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, and have noted that "[d]ishonesty occurs in both the inves-
tigative process and the courtroom."38 Furthermore, judges themselves
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. Telephone Interview with the Public Affairs Office of the Administratively Unified
Courts of Los Angeles County (July 25, 1994). This figure includes the prosecutor's, the
Judge's, court clerk's, and court reporter's salary, along with maintenance and supplies.
Where defense counsel is appointed rather than retained, the defense attorney's salary would
be an additional cost.
38. Orfield, supra note 35, at 82-83.
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have been observed to "knowingly accept police perjury as truthful" in
order to avoid applying the Exclusionary Rule.39 In one important
study in the early 1960's, research showed that
prior to Mapp's extension of the exclusionary rule to the states,
police allegations frequently described suspect behavior that
would not warrant a stop or search. In the year after Mapp, po-
lice suddenly began describing suspect conduct warranting a
search. In particular, police started reporting suspects dropping
narcotics to the ground as the police approached. Thus ... the
New York City police, in the wake of Mapp, began to perjure
themselves on a large scale to avoid the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.'
At best, it is ironic that police officers, who are the mechanism
through which citizens' Fourth Amendment rights are either upheld or
discarded, break the law and lie in order to allow their constitutional
violations to go unanswered as a result of a rule that is designed to deter
illegal police conduct. Clearly, a rule designed to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations must not inspire police officers to commit other
illegal acts in order to cover up Fourth Amendment violations.
5. The Prostituting Effect of the Exclusionary Rule on the Fourth
Amendment
It is difficult to measure the Exclusionary Rule's effect on Ameri-
cans' Fourth Amendment rights. Particularly in cases involving serious
crimes, courts tend to strain the Fourth Amendment to avoid the sup-
pression of reliable evidence. Not infrequently, this convoluted "logic"
results in a court holding that suspect police conduct does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, although logic and reason would suggest other-
wise.41 For example, in United States'v. Dunn,42 police officers entered
the defendant's property by crossing several fences, including two with
barbed wire,43 before reaching a barn on the defendant's property. The
39. Id. at 83.
40. Id. at 97 (citing Comment, The Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizure
Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 87 (1968); M. Ban, Local Compli-
ance with Mapp v. Ohio: The Power of the Supreme Court, (1972 unpublished Ph.D. dissert.,
Harvard) (on file with the University of Colorado Law Review); Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lus-
tig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083
(1959); Myron W. Orfield Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical
Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 1016 (1987)).
41. See George C. Thomas I & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Socie-
tal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REv. 147, 147 (1993).
42. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
43. Id. at 297-98.
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windowless barn had a six foot high door. An opening above the door
was covered by a heavy mesh fabric that appeared opaque from a dis-
tance.' One officer crossed the fences, climbed upon the door, pressed
his face into the mesh fabric, and saw a drug laboratory inside the barn.45
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the legality of the search, ruling that the
officer's activity did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because
the defendant had not sufficiently manifested an expectation of privacy
as to what was inside the barn.' 6
The result of such interpretations of police conduct is a dilution of
the individual rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. While the
courts are "saving" reliable evidence from suppression in individual
cases, they are also chipping away at some of the protections provided
by the Fourth Amendment. The effect on the individual case is short-
lived, but the precedential effect of such decisions linger. After the
Dunn decision, even extraordinary measures to exclude outsiders may
not be viewed as sufficient manifestation of an expectation of privacy.47
Thus, the Fourth Amendment may not apply to invasions of these areas.
The narrowing of circumstances where an individual is said to manifest
an expectation of privacy is a narrowing of the protections granted by
the Fourth Amendment. This occurs because a police officer's invasion
of an area to which an individual does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment
and, thus, the amendment's protections are inapplicable. It is ironic that
constitutionally guaranteed rights may be reduced as a result of courts
straining to avoid the rule they created to protect and enforce those very
rights.
Regardless of one's view of the Exclusionary Rule, it must be clearly
recognized that its costs are very dear indeed. Given its costs, attention
must turn to whether the Rule even accomplishes its stated goal.
C. Does the Exclusionary Rule Deter Police Misconduct?
For the Exclusionary Rule to deter future police misconduct, the ex-
clusion of the evidence must be communicated to the offending officer,
the officer must learn why it was excluded, and he or she must be pro-
vided with some incentive to improve his or her future performance.
44. Id. at 298.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 300-03. The Court also found that the barn was not within the curtilage of the
home and that the barn's contents were not protected from observation by those standing in
open fields. l at 302-03.
47. Id. at 303-05.
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Absent these steps, is there motivation for a police officer to conform his
or her conduct to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment?
Deterrence from wrongful conduct will only occur if notice of that
conduct is effectively communicated to the wrongdoer. However, de-
spite this apparent common sense notion, the Exclusionary Rule con-
tains no provision for any police "education." Indeed, whether the
police officer who has violated a defendant's constitutional rights will
ever learn that he or she has committed such a violation is, at best, un-
certain.48 For example, the most direct educational effect will be felt by
those officers who attend the suppression hearing (perhaps because they
must present evidence of their conduct) and actually hear the court's
ruling on the motion. Even then, the basis of the ruling may not be clear
to the officer, or she may feel that the result was the product of a mis-
guided or even rl-conceived system, rather than the result of her miscon-
duct. In any case, the offending officer often does not attend the
suppression hearing, so no direct lesson is possible. Whether the police
officer is made aware of his or her misconduct will then depend upon
how effectively the prosecutor or police supervisors communicate with
the involved officers. Thus any educational effect of the Exclusionary
Rule is unpredictable and often left completely to chance.49
An additional impediment to the educational aspect of deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations lies in the failure to file many potential
prosecutions that result from constitutionally flawed investigations. A
prosecutor, strongly believing that critical evidence is the product of Me-
gal police activity, is not likely to even file the case. In these situations,
whether the police officer learns that he or she illegally seized a piece of
evidence will depend upon how well the prosecutor or police supervisor
communicates with the offending officer. Again, any such communica-
tion is haphazard at best.
Prior to a case even reaching a prosecutor, as the Supreme Court
observed, the Exclusionary Rule "is powerless to deter invasions of con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest
of serving some other goal."5 In other words, where police invade a
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights, but do not prosecute that individual,
48. See Orfield, supra note 40, at 1046-49 (1987).
49. To be sure, some police departments do have policies that require violations to be
brought to the offending officer(s) attention, but there is no such nationally mandated pro-
gram. These programs are not in widespread national usage. See, eg., Orfield, supra note 40,
at 1046-49 (1987).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
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there is no outside review-such as by a prosecutor or judge-to inform
the officer of the violation.
If the "educational" aspect of deterrence is too vague to reinforce the
"right" and "wrong" ways to obtain evidence, among police officers, the
"punitive" aspect of the Exclusionary Rule is even more questionable.
This is because punishment for illegally obtaining evidence falls directly
upon "the government" by forbidding the use of the illegally obtained
evidence at trial. Such punishment does not fall upon the offending po-
lice officer and, subsequently, any punitive effect felt by the police of-
ficer will be fortuitous. The offending officer suffers no formal negative
consequences for his or her illegal activity. To be sure, some police de-
partments keep track of data involving illegal searches and seizures con-
ducted by officers and may use the data in decisions concerning
promotions, salary increases, and the like. In addition, officers who are
found to have violated a defendant's constitutional rights, and who are
aware of this finding, may feel responsible for a failed prosecution, and
may suffer from loss of stature in the eyes of their colleagues. But be-
cause the punitive effect of the Exclusionary Rule reaches the offending
officers only indirectly, if at all, it seriously compromises the ability to
deter police misconduct. A police officer who has violated a defendant's
rights is not held personally accountable for that violation. In fact, em-
pirical studies support the view that the Rule has a minimal effect on the
police officers' on-the-street behavior. This is the ironic effect of the
American Exclusionary Rule: In essence, the present rule lacks the
power to deter, even though deterrence is the primary objective cited by
the Supreme Court for implementing and then retaining the Exclusion-
ary Rule.51
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule must be explored in view of
the significant costs of the Exclusionary Rule and the serious questions
with respect to whether the Rule even achieves its goal of deterring po-
lice misconduct.
III. INTERNATIONAL PERSPEcrv-
Any serious discussion of options in lieu of the present Rule should
denude the ethnocentricity of the American experience and explore the
treatment of tainted evidence in foreign jurisdictions. Indeed, problems
of police misconduct and the admissibility of evidence derived from that
misconduct are not exclusive to the American experience. Therefore in
51. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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examining alternatives and options this discussion examines the ap-
proaches taken in several other countries with judicial systems, like ours,
based upon the Common Law.
A. United Kingdom
Since the United Kingdom does not have a written document pro-
scribing violations of individual liberties-such as a Bill of Rights, the
protection of citizens from illegal searches and seizures developed
largely through judge-made rules. The English approach to illegally ob-
tained evidence traditionally focused on courtroom procedures and
maintenance of fair trial practices, rather than deterrence of police mis-
conduct or the protection of individual liberties. English courts have
struggled with the appropriate rules for maintaining civility in eviden-
tiary searches and seizures while, at the same time, preserving the fair-
ness of trials and the integrity of verdicts.52
The bulk of evidence that English courts typically exclude is limited
to involuntary confessions. 53 This follows from the premise of the Eng-
lish system that "[j]udges are not responsible for the bringing or aban-
donment of prosecutions and that save in the very rare situation.., of an
abuse of process of the court... the judge is concerned only with the
conduct of the trial."'54 Under this premise, involuntary confessions are
excluded not because such evidence was unfairly obtained, but because
"it is unfair to prosecute the accused" based on the involuntary
confession. 55
However, there are circumstances under which other illegally ob-
tained evidence is excluded by English courts. In R v. Sang,56 it was held
that the trial judge has the discretion to exclude evidence in a criminal
trial, but only on a very limited basis.57 Only evidence obtained from the
accused after the commission of the crime may be excluded. 58 The judge
should not consider the illegality of the police conduct, and in fact, the
judge lacks discretion to exclude evidence based solely on that illegal-
52. See generally, Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to Criminal
Procedure Rules, 14 MicH. J. INT'L. L. 171.
53. Rosemary Pattenden, The Exclusion of Unfairly Obtained Evidence in England, Can-
ada and Australia, 29 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 664, 666 (1980).
54. Id. at 665 (quoting Queen v. Sang, 3 W.L.R. 263, 288 (1979)).
55. Id.
56. 1980 App. Cas. 402 (1980).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 437 (emphasis added). This type of evidence includes confessions and admis-
sions, which, when obtained by illegal means, have little probative value due to their inherent
unreliability.
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ity.59 The judge typically will exercise his or her discretion based upon
the probative value of the evidence. 60 The judge will consider the proba-
tive weight of the evidence, balanced against any unfair prejudicial effect
of that evidence. The judge has the discretion to exclude any evidence if
the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused outweighs its probative
value to the prosecution.
Following the Sang decision, Parliament codified evidentiary rules in
criminal proceedings and promulgated the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act of 1984 (PACE). Under PACE, judges have discretion to exclude
evidence where any of the following grounds exist: where confessions
are obtained "by oppression";61 where confessions are rendered "unreli-
able" by anything anyone says or does;62 where admission of evidence
"would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings
that the court ought not to admit it";63 and where pre-existing common
law powers allowed the exclusion of evidence whose prejudicial effect
outweighed its probative value.' 4
One of PACE's significant departures from common law is that it
"clearly direct[s] the judiciary to 'police the police.' "65 Previously, the
English courts did not recognize deterrence of future illegal police con-
duct to be a goal of the country's limited exclusionary rules.6 6 This
change in English exclusionary policy has been attributed to the new
authority given to the courts by PACE, as well as to the fact that since
there is now a set of clear rules of permissible police conduct, the police
can be expected to follow them.67
The discretion given to British judges, requiring them to consider the
probative weight of the evidence prior to ruling upon its admissibility,
offers a distinct advantage over the American rule of per se exclusion: It
avoids a result that is not proportional to the underlying wrong. Under
the American Rule, the "smoking gun" may be excluded from a murder
59. Id. at 402. For example, evidence gained from an illegal search is not obtained from
the accused and is, therefore, not within the judge's discretion to exclude.
60. Pattenden, supra note 53, at 666.
61. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at § 76(2) [hereinafter PACE].
62. Id.
63. Id. at § 78(1).
64. Bradley, supra note 52, at 190 (citing David Feldman, Regulating Treatment of Sus-
pects in the Police Station: Judicial Interpretation of Detention Provisions in the Police Crimi-
nal Evidence Act 1984, 1990 CRiM. L. Racv. 452 (1990)).
65. Id. at 187. For example, PACE includes confessions obtained "by oppression" as one
of the grounds for exclusion of evidence. PACE, supra note 61, at § 76(2).
66. See Bradley, supra note 52, at 186.
67. Id. at 190 (citing Feldman, supra note 64, at 452).
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trial, making conviction impossible, solely because a police officer has
made a minor blunder with respect to Fourth Amendment law. Exclu-
sion of such evidence in a proceeding involving a minor offense may
seem like a satisfactory result. Similarly, exclusion of such evidence in a
proceeding involving a serious offense may seem reasonable in light of
truly egregious police misconduct. However, exclusion of highly proba-
tive evidence in a serious criminal case based upon a minor police error
reveals one of the serious weaknesses in the American scheme: We lack
the ability, unlike our British counterparts, to make the remedy propor-
tional to the type of wrongful conduct involved and to the remedy's
overall effect on the truth-finding process of the criminal justice system.
In addition to a judge's power to exclude evidence in order to deter
future police misconduct, the English system provides disciplinary meas-
ures for police officers who do not comply with PACE (which sets forth a
detailed and comprehensive code of conduct for police officers to follow
when investigating a crime).6" These measures include fines, pay cuts,
undesirable transfers, and removal from the force.6 9 Police can also be
held liable as trespassers by victims of illegal police procedure.70
Under English common law, the law of evidence is designed to assist
the truth-finding process of a trial. The traditional-and probably still
most substantial-purpose of the English exclusionary policy revolves
around the integrity and legitimacy of the judicial process. However, it
would seem that PACE has helped the English system to evolve into a
system that no longer ignores illegal police activity.7' Another result of
PACE is that England is undergoing a "criminal procedure revolution"
at the hands of the Code's discretionary exclusionary law.72 It is strongly
suggested that if by the English experience "the U.S. rules were clearly
stated in statutory form, it would be possible to relax somewhat the
mandatory exclusionary rule that has caused so much difficulty [in the
U.S.]."73
On the other hand, the English Codes of Practice (designed for po-
lice officers to follow during criminal investigations) and PACE (because
of its incorporation of other statutory provisions) have been criticized as
difficult to effectively follow and interpret because they are too com-
68. PACE, supra note 61, at § 67(8).
69. Id. See also Comment, Barry F. Shanks, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary
Rule and its Alternatives, 52 Tn.. L. RE-v. 648, 663 (1983).
70. Shanks, supra note 69, at 663.
71. Bradley, supra note 52, at 190.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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plex.74 The lesson to be gained is that while statutory delineation of po-
lice officer conduct and judicial discretion can aim to strike a more
satisfactory balance between the rights of the criminal defendant and the
public interest, an overly-complex scheme may be as unpredictable and
difficult to administer as one that allows too much police or judicial
discretion.75
B. Canada
Canada's exclusionary policy developed similarly to England's. How-
ever, the Canadians broke from the English common law tradition with
the advent of the Canadian Constitution in 1982.76 Apparently influ-
enced by the United States Constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (the Charter), provides that "everyone has the right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure."77
The Charter vests the courts with the discretion to exclude evidence
that infringes upon its guaranteed fundamental rights.78 Section 24 of
the Charter states:
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court consid-
ers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court con-
cludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evi-
dence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to
all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring administration of justice into disrepute.79
74. Id. at 190-91.
75. Id.
76. Like England, the Canadian exclusionary rule evolved into a limited discretionary
policy. The Canadian Supreme Court held in Queen v. Wray that a judge has limited discre-
tion to exclude evidence "gravely prejudicial to the accused, the admissibility of which is tenu-
ous and whose probative force in relation to the main issue before the court is trifling."
Queen v. Wray, 11 D.L.R. 3d 673, 689-90 (Can. 1970). In Wray, the police obtained informa-
tion concerning the whereabouts of a rifle after the accused made an involuntary confession.
The Canadian Court went so far as to say that a judge does not have discretion to exclude
unfairly obtained evidence. Thus, like the English court system, the emphasis is on fairness of
the trial and not on the method of procuring evidence. Wray proves that the focus does not
concern the accused, rather the court may only exclude evidence that has a high probability of
unreliability. Regardless of the involuntary nature of the confession, the rifle itself was relia-
ble and highly probative evidence. Id.
77. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter), § 8.
78. Id. at pt. I, § 24.
79. Id.
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This guideline for the courts has resulted in a two-part test to determine
whether to exclude the evidence. First, the court must determine if the
evidence was obtained in a manner that violated the rights provided by
the Constitution. Second, the court must determine whether admission
of that evidence would bring disrepute to the administration of justice.80
In Queen v. Wray,81 Canada's equivalent to Mapp v. Ohio,' the Cana-
dian Court held: "It is only the admission of evidence gravely prejudicial
to the accused, the admissibility of which is tenuous and whose probative
force in relation to the main issue before the Court is trifling, which can
be said to operate unfairly."83 Thus, while the Constitution's language
indicates that Canadian judges have the ability to potentially exclude a
great deal of evidence, in practice the judge's discretion is exercised
within tight parameters.8
Similar to England's PACE Act, the Canadian Constitution directs
judges to weigh all of the circumstances when making an exclusionary
decision. The effects of the Canadian exclusionary rule on illegally ob-
tained evidence are similar to those observed as result of England's rule:
Generally, suspect testimonial or confessional evidence more likely vio-
late the Constitution, while real-physical-evidence, because its exist-
ence does not depend upon a constitutional violation, retains a greater
chance of admissibility. 5 In contrast to PACE, the Canadian Constitu-
80. See Scott C. Hutchinson & James C. Morton, Search and Seizure Law in Canada
§ 9(h)(119). The party that seeks to exclude the evidence has the burden of proving that both
of these prongs are violated. See Collins v. Queen, 1 S.C.R. 265 (Can. 1987).
81. 11 D.L.R. 673.
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. Wray, 11 D.L.R. at 689-90.
84. Shanks, supra note 69, at 663-65.
85. See Collins v. Queen, 1 S.C.R. 265, 284 (Can. 1987). In deciding whether real evi-
dence is unfair to the accused or whether it will bring disrepute to the administration of jus-
tice, the Canadian Supreme Court has stated:
One factor to consider in assessing the fairness of a trial is whether an accused is forced
to assist the Crown to build the case against himself or herself. The common law has
recognized that it is up to the Crown to prove the case entirely, and that it is unfair to
conscript accused persons against themselves. In this case, the appellant seeks to have
real evidence excluded. The evidence was not qreated by the breach of a Charter right,
nor was it found by forcing the appellant to participate in the illegal search or to iden-
tify the objects seized in the search. On the facts of this case, I do not think that the
admission of the evidence would have an unfair effect on the trial. -
Queen v. Genest, 1 S.C.R. 59, 83 (Can. 1989). It would seem that the court, after this case,
would find that the evidence obtained in Wray would not pass constitutional muster because
the accused helped the police with their search based on an involuntary confession.
In Collins, the court held that where real (physical) evidence is concerned, the exclusion-
ary rule should "rarely" be applied. Bradley, supra note 52, at 199 (citing 38 D.L.R. 4th 508
(Can. 1987)).
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tion expressly gives a court the right to exclude evidence for infringe-
ment of individual liberties if such an encroachment would have an ill
effect on the judicial process. As a result, the Canadian system allows
judges broader exclusionary discretion than that enjoyed by English
judges.
Canadian policy generally views a criminal proceeding as independ-
ent and separate from the process of disciplining and deterring police
misconduct. Hence, Canada employs alternative methods of criminal
prosecution and civil tort liability to deter police misconduct.8 6 These
remedies are limited because, for example, if an officer acts in good
faith, he or she will not be held liable regardless of the validity of the
applicable warranty However, an officer will generally be held liable if
he or she lacks good faith and improperly executes a warrant, or exceeds
the authority stated on the face of the warrant.'
In practice, matters such as search warrant requirements are spelled
out in the Canadian codes. 89 As a result, the Canadian system can be
viewed as a hybrid of the United States' almost entirely judge-made
rules of criminal procedure and the primarily code driven system cur-
rently in place in England. 90 Such a hybrid, it has been observed, results
in an unique system where "a code is the proper way to make rules...
and that a discretionary, but frequently applied, exclusionary rule is the
appropriate check on police misbehavior."'"
Although the Canadian Exclusionary Rule appears to be closer to
the American Exclusionary Rule than to the English approach, judicial
discretion is more likely to lead to English-oriented results. The limits
upon the judges' exercise of their discretion, as stated in Wray,' make it
very unlikely that crucial evidence will be excluded at trial. Addition-
ally, unlike the United States, Canada does not rely upon its discretion-
ary exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct. Instead, it relies upon
independent civil or criminal proceedings, where the offending officer's
state of mind is the central issue. The proceedings deter wrongful police
conduct by holding officers personally liable for their wrongful conduct.
Canadian courts are strict when it comes to interrogation requirements, but more willing
to admit illegally obtained physical evidence. Id. at 199-200.
86. Shanks, supra note 69, at 657.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Bradley, supra note 52, at 195-202.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 202-03.
92. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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C. Australia
Australia's exclusionary policy relies upon policy considerations simi-
lar to those of the United Kingdom and Canada. In Bunning v. Cross,93
the seminal Australian exclusionary case, the Australian High Court held
that a judge has the discretion to exclude improperly obtained evi-
dence.94 However, the Court rejected the English notion that a fair trial
is the only consideration the court must heed in exercising its discretion.
The Bunning Court held that "it is by reference to large matters of pub-
lie policy rather than solely to considerations of fairness to the accused
that the discretion here in question is to be exercised."9 Furthermore,
the Court provided that: "On the one hand there is the public need to
bring to conviction those who commit criminal offenses. On the other
hand, there is the public interest in the protection of the individual from
unlawful and unfair treatment. ''96
Pursuant to these broad policy goals, the Bunning Court laid down
several factors for the trial court to employ when determining whether
to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Five of these factors are as
follows:
[F]irst, was there any deliberate disregard of the law by the po-
lice, or were they merely mistaken as to the proper extent of the
law; second, did the nature of the illegality affect the cogency of
the evidence; third, how easily could the law have been complied
with by the police-was there a deliberate "cutting of comers";
fourth, what was the nature of the offense charged; and last, did
the relevant legislation give any hints as to how strictly to control
police powers? 97
The trial judge has broad discretion to decide whether the evidence
should be admitted or excluded based on these factors.98
93. 111 D.L.R. 673 (1990); 141 C.L.R. 54 (Austl. 1978). In Bunning, the police obtained a
breath specimen from the accused without first performing a roadside test for intoxication. ld.
at 57.
94. Id. at 72-74.
95. Id. at 77.
96. Id. at 72. See also Pattenden, supra note 53, at 673. Pattenden logically writes:
There may well be cases where the harm to society which the accused threatened was
so great and the situation so urgent that even deliberate illegality must be tolerated.
Equally there may be cases where it would be unreasonable to deprive the prosecution
of evidence because of some minor and unintentional invasion of the accused's rights.
Id.
97. Pattenden, supra note 53, at 674.
98. See Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for its Re-emergence in the Adjudica-
tion of Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRiM. L. & CRImINOLOGY 462,493-94 (1993).
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The Australian system does consider the deliberateness of police mis-
conduct when deciding whether to exclude evidence. This is based on
the rationale that society has a right to "insist that those who enforce the
law themselves respect it, so that a citizen's precious right to immunity
from arbitrary and unlawful intrusion into the daily affairs of private life
may remain unimpaired." 99 But, as with the English and Canadian sys-
tems, police misconduct does not automatically result in exclusion of
evidence.
Australia's approach guides the judge's process of discretionary bal-
ancing by setting out specific types of police conduct that are particularly
suspect, as does England's PACE. As in England, yet in contrast to Can-
ada, Australia does consider deterrence of police misconduct as a pur-
pose behind its rule allowing exclusion of evidence.
This system may seem like a logical and appropriate approach to ex-
cluding evidence in a criminal trial, but it is not without its drawbacks.
The burden of proof in a court's application of its discretion to exclude
illegally obtained evidence lies with the person seeking exclusion: the
accused.'00 The accused faces a formidable task when calling on judicial
exclusionary discretion.
The Australian judge's decision as to whose rights deserve protection
is exercised on a case-by-case basis. 1 1 This results in protection of not
only the rights of the accused, but also the rights of the victim and the
public at large. The rights of the latter two are not even considered
under the American Exclusionary Rule.
Of the English common law countries, Australia's approach may pro-
vide the greatest protection for the integrity of the judicial system. How-
ever, it suffers from some shortcomings. It imposes the burden of proof
on the defendant, who may be unlikely to have the information or the
resources to successfully carry that burden. Furthermore, although its
focus upon the deliberateness of the police misconduct suggests that de-
terrence of such misconduct is a primary purpose behind Australia's ex-
clusionary practices, the fact that the court may use other factors to
justify admitting even maliciously seized evidence seems to completely
undercut any possible deterrent effect, which, as noted in the discussion
of the American Exclusionary Rule, would be speculative at best.
99. Bunning, 141 C.L.R. at 75.
100. See, e.g., Meng Heong Yeo, Inclusionary Discretion Over Unfairly Obtained Evi-
dence, 31 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 392 (1982).
101. See Pattenden, supra note 53, at 671-75 (explaining Australia's practice of basing
exclusionary decisions on a balancing of the degree to which the factors are implicated in any
given case).
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D. New Zealand
New Zealand, another English common law country, approaches the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence without a codified exclusionary
rule. The country's approach to exclusion is judge-made:10 2
The test to be applied in considering whether evidence is ad-
missible is whether it is relevant to the matters at issue. If it is, it
is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evi-
dence was obtained.... No doubt in criminal cases the judge
always has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of
admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused.'03
The New Zealand appellate courts read "unfairness" broadly and, as
time progresses, seem more willing to examine how any police miscon-
duct affects the accused. °4 To determine what is unfair, a judge weighs
the consequences of the police officer's conduct against the "importance
of convicting the guilty."'01 5 The exercise of judicial discretion in New
Zealand has resulted in the exclusion of fruits of illegal searches and
seizures. 05
In practice, however, the New Zealand courts do not exclude as
much evidence as is indicated in their doctrinal language.'0 7 Illegally
seized physical evidence has never been excluded in New Zealand, and
such exclusion is only possible where "a wholly unwarranted and lengthy
detection involving a wholly unwarranted search of a person and/or
places" occurred.0 This is unlikely to ever occur because, under appli-
cable law, an investigation that turns up evidence of crime cannot be
"wholly unwarranted."' 0 9  Thus, a gap is left between the theory and
practice of New Zealand criminal procedure." 0
In general, the philosophy behind the New Zealand system seems to
be that the country's judiciary "[is] not looking for an isolated slip-up but
a compounding of errors and improprieties, an improper course of con-
duct which, taken as a whole, indicates unfair police practices.""'
102. J. B. Dawson, The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative
Study, 31 Iwr'L. & Comp. L.Q. 513, 541 (1982).
103. Id. at 534 (quoting Kuruma v. R., A.C. 197, 203-4 (1955)).
104. I& at 541.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 542.
108. Id. at 541 (quoting Queen v. Lee, 1 N. Z. L. R. 481, 482 (P.C. 1978).
109. Id. at 541.
110. Id. at 542.
111. Id.
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A comparison between New Zealand's practice and the American
Exclusionary Rule does not provide much helpful guidance in determin-
ing the propriety of the American consequence of Fourth Amendment
violations. This is because the underlying right in New Zealand has been
construed much more narrowly. A rule in America that would exclude
illegally seized evidence, but would legalize all searches and seizures that
turn up evidence of a crime, would effectively eviscerate the underlying
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
IV. A NEw PROPOSAL
Drawing from the international perspective and acknowledging both
the failure to accomplish the intended purpose and the associated costs
of the American Rule, it is important to heed the words of Justice Black-
mun in his concurring opinion in United States v. Leon:
If a single principle may be drawn from this Court's exclusion-
ary rule decisions, from Weeks through Mapp v. Ohio,"2 to the
decisions handed down today, it is that the scope of the exclusion-
ary rule is subject to change in light of changing judicial under-
standing about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the
courtroom.
1 3
Indeed, Justice Blackmun's pointed remark reflects the Supreme Court's
long held notion that the Exclusionary Rule is not necessarily sacrosanct,
but rather the best remedy at hand to ensure the integrity of the Fourth
Amendment when the Rule was created. It seems implicit that if an-
other remedy surfaced that better protected the Fourth Amendment
without the costly baggage of the Exclusionary Rule, the Court, or per-
haps even Congress," 4 would seriously entertain that option.
112. 367 U.S. 643.
113. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984).
114. In his 1991 crime bill, President Bush proposed limitations on the operation of the
Exclusionary Rule in federal courts. Michael K. Frisby, Congress Passes Key Bills at Wire;
Crime Plan Fails in Rush to Adjourn, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 28, 1991, at 1. The bill sought to
expand the good-faith exception used in searches conducted under the authority of a flawed
search warrant where the police officer had an "objectively reasonable 'good-faith' belief"
that there was probable cause to justify a search. Charley Roberts, New Crime Bill Seen Un-
likely in Election Year, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 5, 1991, at 1, 13. The bill failed at the hands of a
Senate filibuster unrelated to the Exclusionary Rule issue. Frisby, supra at 1. The inclusion of
Exclusionary Rule reform in the President's crime bill evidences the executive and legislative
concern over the problems surrounding the Rule.
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A. Requirements of Exclusionary Rule Reform
In order to effectively deter future police misconduct, two things
must happen: The police officer engaging in misconduct must be edu-
cated as to the wrongful nature of his or her conduct,115 and the offend-
ing officer must suffer some negative consequence as a direct result of
the misconduct.1 6 As already stated, the problem with the Exclusionary
Rule is that, in actual application, it fails both as an educational tool and
as a punishment. 117 Despite the numerous critics of the Exclusionary
Rule, few, if any, would advocate abandoning the Rule without adopt-
ing, in its place, some scheme that preserves the integrity of the judicial
system and acts as a deterrent to future violations of a criminal defend-
115. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 35, at 91-94. The article states that, "the exclusionary
rule deters illegal police behavior by educating police officers in the law of search and
seizure." Id at 91.
See also Orfield, supra note 40, at 1033-42. ("[c]ritics maintain that the officers often do
not understand the reasons for suppression. They cannot understand the judge's ruling; the
prosecutor does not explain it to them; and no other official or institution ensures that the
police understand." Id. at 1033); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CI. L. REv. 665,730-32 (1970). "[The search and seizure rules] 'would not
deter or enlighten a policeman ... with a Ph.D. who was going to law school at night.'" Id. at
731 (quoting Robert E. Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV.
80, 100 (1969)); Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MiCH. L. REv. 987, 1005
(1965) (The authors state that "the trial judge seldom explains his decision in a way likely to
be understood by the police officer, and the prosecutor assigned to the case rarely assumes it
to be his duty to inform the police department of the meaning of the decision or of its in-
tended impact upon current police practice." Id; see generally Wayne R. LaFave, Improving
Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I Current Police and Local Court
Practice, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 415-21 (1965).
116. See e.g., Report to the Attorney Generak The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule
25 (1986) ([c]ommentators have observed that "the exclusionary rule has a negligible deter-
rent effect on the transgressing officer because it does not punish him directly"); Dallin H.
Oaks, supra note 115, at 709-10.
Other commentators have noted that the exclusionary rule is not aimed at special de-
terrence since it does not impose any direct punishment on a law enforcement official
who has broken the rule. An officer may of course experience disappointment at see-
ing evidence suppressed and an offender go free, and that experience may affect his
future behavior. If the officer also had to suffer departmental discipline or forfeit pro-
motion, prestige, or other advantages because of the application of the exclusionary
rule to his cases, then this could give the exclusionary rule an important special deter-
rent effect.
Oaks, supra note 115, at 709-10. STEVEN R. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUsTIcE: THE
PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EvmENCE 71 (1977) ("Discussion of alternatives to the
exclusionary rule must begin with the objectives to be achieved through their use. These [in-
clude] the deterrence of police misbehavior through identification and discipline of offending
official(s)").
117. See supra part II. B-C.
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ant's Fourth Amendment rights. Clearly, whether to respect those
Fourth Amendment rights that were considered sufficiently valuable to
include in the Bill of Rights is a decision too valuable to be left to the
government employee's discretion. The ideal solution is one that will
not only deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment by means of
education, punishment, and police department regulatory reform, but
also provide an incentive for criminal defendants to raise the Fourth
Amendment issue.
1. Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations
As suggested above, successful deterrence of Fourth Amendment vi-
olations depends on two things: 1) educating the offending governmen-
tal agent/agency as to how the conduct violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights and how such violations can be avoided, and 2) pro-
viding appropriate negative consequences for those who actually violate,
or suborn violation of Fourth Amendment rights." 8
a. Educating the Offending Officers
Under the present system, there is no mechanism guaranteeing that
any useful information reaches the offending officer/agency concerning
how the acts of the police officer violated a person's Fourth Amendment
rights or, most importantly, how to avoid such violations in the future.
Indeed, there is not even a mechanism to ensure that the offending of-
ficer is informed that his conduct was violative of someone's Fourth
Amendment rights. Unfortunately, any educational "benefits" that
might occur under the existing format are frequently happenstance: the
officer was in court when the judge made his ruling; the prosecutor
sought out the officer to explain the problem; or the police agency was
informed of the problem and sought out to inform and counsel the of-
ficer. Given the practicalities of the American criminal justice system,
the educational benefits will likely not occur absent some systematic ap-
proach directed at both informing and educating the officer.
Therefore, any scheme designed to better promote the sanctity of the
Fourth Amendment must begin with some systemized method of inform-
ing the offending officer of his or her failure. It would seem that the
most efficient manner of informing the officer would be placing the onus
118. But, as we have argued, the deterrent effect of the present Exclusionary Rule is dubi-
ous at best. See supra part II. C. We do not suggest that the offending agents or agencies will
be deterred from future violations of the Fourth Amendment merely by the possibility of a
defendant receiving a reduced prison term.
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on the prosecuting agency, or the court rendering the ruling, to inform
both the officer and the officer's department. That responsibility must
be squarely placed so that the information is dispensed as a matter of
course.
Once so informed, the officer must be educated both as to the nature
of the error and how to properly engage herself or himself in the future.
A way to achieve this kind of education is to institute a class for those
police officers who are found to have violated the Fourth Amendment.
When officers violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights, they would
be required to spend time in a class learning (or re-learning) the consti-
tutional limitations of searches and seizures.
Although the primary function of the Fourth Amendment classes
would be educational, the classes could also be structured to carry a "pu-
nitive" aspect, such as requiring officers to attend during "off-duty" time
and/or not paying the officer for the time spent attending the class. The
educational aspect of such classes could also be furthered by publishing
regular bulletins for all law enforcement agencies describing the type of
conduct found to violate the Fourth Amendment. The bulletins should
be used in the classes and disseminated to all active officers.
b. Punishing the Offending Officers
While education will help police officers avoid Fourth Amendment
violations by keeping them up-to-date on appropriate conduct during in-
vestigations, punitive measures may be needed to (1) reinforce the im-
portance of respecting citizens' Fourth Amendment rights and (2) to
ensure that the offending conduct is taken seriously by the officer. Any
system of punishment must recognize, however, that certain actions
taken by a police officer that are later found to violate the Fourth
Amendment may be the product of an innocent misunderstanding of a
very confusing area of law.
The degree of punishment should vary according to the officer's of-
fending conduct. An "innocent" mistake, one that is the product, for
example, of ambiguous legal standards being applied in the heat of an
investigation, may need no more punitive measures than merely requir-
ing the offending officers to attend a Fourth Amendment class. The
knowing, willful, or intentional disregard of a person's Fourth Amend-
ment rights may warrant the imposition of a more punitive measure to
accomplish the desired deterrence. Thus, such conduct may warrant a
"community service" requirement, a fine, a suspension from work, a re-
1994]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
assignment to less desirable duties, or other action deemed appropriate
according to the nature of the violation.119
The goal would be to ensure that, when punishment for wrongful
conduct is warranted, the punishment must land squarely on those
whose conduct has violated the law, rather than result in the indirect
"punishment" of the current Exclusionary Rule.
2. Providing an Incentive
As mentioned above, there must be some incentive for the criminal
defendant to raise the Fourth Amendment violation issue. Under ex-
isting law, the Exclusionary Rule provides a remarkable, if not a fre-
quently equitable incentive. For reasons already set forth, exclusion of
evidence is often too great a windfall and does not further the goal of
deterring future illegal police conduct. Nonetheless, the existence of an
incentive is crucial. If the criminal defendant does not have an incentive
to raise the exclusionary issue, it is likely that the violation will go unno-
ticed. Certainly, the offending government agency will not bring it to the
court's attention. As noted above, officers have even committed perjury
to cover up such transgressions. The courts are not usually in a position
to raise the issue of Fourth Amendment violations, because unless the
pertinent facts are brought to the attention of the courts, a court will not
have sufficient information upon which it can identify Fourth Amend-
ment violations. Even where violations are apparent, the overburdened
courts may be reluctant to raise these issues sua sponte because of judi-
cial resources that are both scarce and expensive. The defendant re-
mains the only person who has an interest in raising the issue. While
there is the concern that the Exclusionary Rule devalues Fourth Amend-
ment rights because courts strain to avoid excluding evidence, the pro-
tection of even these devalued rights would be lost if criminal defendants
did not raise the issue. Therefore, any scheme that might replace the
current Exclusionary Rule must provide the criminal defendant with
some benefit sufficient to act as an incentive to bring the Fourth Amend-
ment violation to the attention of the appropriate tribunal.
A possible alternative method that provides a suitable incentive
would admit the evidence allegedly seized in violation of the defendant's
119. It may be preferable to leave the development of appropriate punitive measures to
local authorities, rather than having a nationally-mandated punitive scheme, so long as there is
some mechanism (such as federal funding provisions) for ensuring the adoption of appropriate
punitive measures.
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Fourth Amendment right at trial,120 but reward the defendant whose
rights have been violated by a reduction in his or her sentence.121 The
reduction in the prison sentence must be significant enough to provide
an incentive to a criminal defendant to challenge a search or seizure. For
example, a defendant may receive a percentage reduction in his prison
sentence for successfully establishing that evidence used to convict was
seized in violation of Fourth Amendment rights."z Under this scheme,
it would be appropriate to delay the challenge until after sentencing so
that the sentencing judge would not be influenced by the possibility of a
later reduction in jail time.123
Providing the defendant's incentive to raise Fourth Amendment vio-
lations through a sentence reduction rather than through otherwise com-
petent evidence exclusion is preferable to the Exclusionary Rule. It will
still bring to light police misconduct while still protecting the integrity of
the criminal justice system by allowing it to convict those who have vio-
lated criminal laws. Although convicted criminals will face reduced pun-
ishment, they will still carry their criminal convictions, which trigger
myriad legal consequences, including limitations on the ability to own
firearms, the ability to hold certain types of employment, and the appli-
cation of repeat offender statutes-such as "three strikes" laws. More-
over, the problem of a defendant receiving a windfall disproportionate
to the violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights, which exists
under the current Exclusionary Rule, will be somewhat abrogated.
120. This assumes, of course, that the unlawfully seized evidence is reliable. Evidence that
is seized in a way that brings into question the reliability of its probative value in determining
guilt or innocence should remain excludable at trial. These situations, however, will be rare.
121. While some may argue that this does not provide an incentive to those whose rights
have been violated but, nonetheless, are acquitted of a crime (because no sentence is imposed
and, therefore, no sentence can be reduced), this concern does not justify rejection of the
proposed change. Even under existing law, the standing rules prevent persons other than
criminal defendants whose privacy or possessory interests have been violated from invoking
the Exclusionary Rule. Furthermore, persons who have been injured by the violation of their
civil rights may bring actions against the government for compensation, irrespective of
whether they are convicted of, or even charged with a crime.
122. The effect of establishing a Fourth Amendment violation will be less drastic than
under the present Exclusionary Rule-because it admits evidence that will lead to conviction.
Therefore, it may be sensible to expand the standing rules so that a defendant can raise the
violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment rights that produced evidence against the
defendant.
123. Some courts will see the issue coming as a result of the proceedings at trial. How-
ever, mandatory or recommended sentencing guidelines should act as a check on those judges
who hand down an unusually harsh sentence to "compensate" in advance for the possibility of
a defendant's successful motion to reduce his or her sentence based on a Fourth Amendment
violation.
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A legitimate concern with using sentence reduction as an incentive to
raising the violation is that the trial judge may negate the sentence re-
duction by imposing a harsher penalty on conviction. While acknowl-
edging that this concern presupposes a judge acting in bad faith, several
approaches could be undertaken to avoid such an impropriety or even
the appearance of such impropriety. For example, the Fourth Amend-
ment issue could be raised after sentencing is complete, the case could
simply be reassigned to a different judge, or perhaps the justice system
could have independent judges who hear only Fourth Amendment is-
sues. Additionally, mandatory sentencing guidelines, which curb judicial
discretion, limit the ability of a judge to hand down unduly harsh
sentences. With these or any other appropriate measures in place, the
prospect of judges increasing criminal sentences as "insurance" against
any penalty reduction is minimal.
3. The Mechanics
a. Raising the Issue
Having discussed the need to give a criminal defendant an incentive
to raise the issue of a Fourth Amendment violation, and the need to
deter future violations by educating and punishing the offending officers
or agencies, it is next important to examine the mechanics necessary to
institute such a scheme.
As noted above, if the incentive to raise the Fourth Amendment vio-
lation is provided by possible sentence reduction, the search and seizure
is best raised after imposing the sentence. This prevents courts from
compensating in advance for a reduced sentence by imposing a harsher
penalty where they suspect a Fourth Amendment violation.
There remains the question of with whom to raise the issue. The
judge who is most familiar with the case may be in the best position to
evaluate the allegedly offensive conduct, but may also be influenced by a
desire to see his or her sentences carried out as imposed and, therefore,
may not be sufficiently impartial to decide the issue. However, the cur-
rent prevalence of mandatory sentencing will likely diminish these con-
cerns as time goes on.
One alternative might be to have a separate tribunal, independent
from the litigating parties and the sentencing court, charged with hearing
these issues.
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b. Reducing the Sentence
When a Fourth Amendment violation is found, the judge should re-
duce a defendant's sentence by a certain percentage based on the gravity
of the violation." 4 Since the reduction will be used to give the defend-
ant an incentive to raise the Fourth Amendment issue, the more egre-
gious the police officer's conduct, the more society wants that conduct to
be brought to light and the offending officer to pay for the violation.
Thus, the more egregious the Fourth Amendment violation suffered by
the defendant, the greater the sentence reduction should be.1 5
In reducing a defendant's sentence, the most important factor should
be the extent of the invasion of the defendant's privacy. Did the officers,
as in Mapp v. Ohio,26 forcibly enter the defendant's home without a
warrant, handcuff the defendant, and search every room of her house?
Or, as in United States v. Leon,12 7 did the officers conduct an extensive
investigation and seize evidence under the color of a facially valid search
warrant that only later turned out to lack probable cause? Did the of-
ficer subject the defendant to a body cavity search without a warrant or
probable cause, or did the officer perform an outer clothing pat-down of
defendant's person under a good faith belief that he or she had reason-
able suspicion, but a judge later decided the officer did not? Since the
Fourth Amendment guarantees a citizen's right to be secure in his or her
person, house, papers, and effects, 12 the government's invasions of these
securities is the crucial wrong that must be accounted for by the govern-
ment. Thus, the most weight in sentence reductions should be given to
124. There are, however, problems with the percentage reduction scheme. First, in death
penalty cases there is no real way to decrease a death sentence. To deal with this problem, the
authors suggest that death sentences could be reduced to life sentences, or the existence of a
Fourth Amendment violation could be included in the statutory factors used by juries to de-
termine whether a defendant will be sentenced to death or to life in prison without the possi-
bility of parole. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 et seq. (West 1994). Second, where a defendant
is sentenced to consecutive life sentences, a reduction in his or her sentence from three to two
life terms would not be an effective incentive to raise the Fourth Amendment issue. The
authors suggest that consecutive life sentences be reduced to life in prison with possibility of
parole. That way, while the defendant may still spend the rest of his or her life in jail, the
possibility of parole may provide an incentive to raise the issue. For both of these problems,
the authors acknowledge their inability to define solutions and invite the legislature or other
criminal justice experts to study the issue.
125. The actual percentages by which sentences should be reduced is a question best left
to the legislature. Just as the legislature determines the amount of time a defendant serves for
a particular offense, it should determine the defendant's sentence percentage reduction upon
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
126. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
127. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the invasion of privacy suffered by the defendant in order to ensure that
this type of illegal activity is brought to the courts' attention.
Another similar and important consideration in sentence reduction is
the extent of any physical or psychological harm suffered by the defend-
ant during the course of an illegal search or seizure. Did the officer drag
the defendant out of his car, force him onto the ground, handcuff his
arms and legs, and then drag him back to and throw him into the police
car without probable cause to arrest him? Or did the officer merely
search the defendant's car without probable cause?
Any public humiliation suffered by the defendant in violation of his
or her Fourth Amendment rights should also be taken into account in a
sentence reduction. An officer may publicly humiliate a defendant in a
number of ways. For example, an ethnic minority may be improperly
singled out as a criminal in a white neighborhood or school. A woman
may be sexually harassed by an officer during arrest procedures in front
of another police officer. An officer may improperly seize evidence from
a suspect at his or her place of business in front of the suspect's col-
leagues when the evidence could have easily been seized in private.
Again, these kinds of considerations go to the gravity of the Fourth
Amendment violation suffered by a defendant.
The sentence reduction scheme should thus center around the partic-
ular circumstances of the Fourth Amendment violation suffered by each
defendant, just as the defendant's conviction and sentence are tailored to
the particular circumstances of his or her criminal activity.
c. Communication and Education
Currently, one of the problems with the Exclusionary Rule is that
police officers and departments are not always aware of the reasons be-
hind the exclusion of evidence. Under a sentence reduction scheme such
as the one proposed, a judge's findings of illegal police conduct would
have to be communicated to the offending officer and department, along
with the rationale for those findings. This could be done by directly issu-
ing written judicial opinions to the offending officer and his or her supe-
rior after each sentence reduction decision. These opinions would lay
out the reasons that particular conduct violated the Fourth Amendment
as well as the reasons behind a judge's particular percentage reduction.
That way, not only would officers be aware of a violation, but they would
be aware of why particular conduct was illegal and the serious conse-
quences of such conduct.
From this point, officers who violate the Fourth Amendment should
be required to attend Fourth Amendment classes as discussed above.
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Armed with an explanation of why their conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment, offending officers attending Fourth Amendment class
would be able to understand how to go about searches and seizures with-
out committing similar violations in the future. As a result, officers
would be able to alter their behavior to conform to the Fourth Amend-
ment in a more informed manner than if they, as is presently the case,
just happened to be made aware of the violation.
d. Punishment
If police officers are to be punished for their illegal behavior, their
punishment must be proportionate to the violation, just as it is for the
apprehended criminals. In other words, each officer's conduct must be
examined in light of the circumstances surrounding the particular Fourth
Amendment violation, any history the officer has of Fourth Amendment
violations, and his or her department's Fourth Amendment record. As a
result, a police officer who makes a good faith mistake for the first time
will not suffer the same punishment as an officer who, for the fifth time,
intentionally breaks into a defendant's house and rummages through his
or her drawers at four in the morning.
The first and most important consideration in determining an offend-
ing officer's punishment is the circumstances surrounding the Fourth
Amendment violation at issue. The egregiousness of the police officer's
behavior toward the defendant is the key consideration. Did the officer
intentionally harass the defendant? Did the officer harass the defendant
because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or sex? Did the officer inten-
tionally disregard department search and seizure procedures when he or
she should have known that doing so would violate the suspect's Fourth
Amendment rights? Or, did the officer, while in hot pursuit, make a
close judgment call that was later held unconstitutional? Behavior that
is clearly offensive and smacks of intentional illegal conduct is intolera-
ble, and officers exhibiting that behavior should be severely punished as
a result. On the other hand, a good faith mistake should be recognized
by the offending officer as an error, but an educational remedy, as op-
posed to punishment, would suffice.
Another significant consideration in determining the appropriate de-
gree of education and punishment would be the officer's history vis-A-vis
Fourth Amendment violations. A pattern of violations by a particular
officer would suggest anything from a lack of understanding of proper
police conduct to an intentional disregard for a suspect's rights.
Whatever the case may be, in order to deter future illegal conduct suc-
cessfully, the officer's punishment should be tailored to address the moti-
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vations behind an officer's pattern of behavior. If it appears to a judge
that an officer continually violates the Fourth Amendment even though
he or she knows exactly why their conduct is illegal, then a penalty focus-
ing on punishment rather than education is appropriate. An officer who
conducts his or her second illegal search or seizure because of a second
good faith mistake may need no more than another Fourth Amendment
training class. Essentially, the message that must be communicated is
that illegal searches and seizures violate the law and that further inten-
tional violations of the law are punishable.
Finally, it is important to examine the policies and practices of the
offending officer's department as a whole. The recurrence of illegal
searches and seizures throughout a particular department may evidence
problems with departmental leadership, regulations, training practices,
or search and seizure procedures. In such a case, the offending officer
may have simply been following departmental regulations or custom. It
is necessary to address these institutional deficiencies in particular police
departments. This may mean requiring policy reform, or training pro-
grams, or even holding the supervisors or chiefs of offending officers re-
sponsible, targeting them for appropriate punitive measures. Again, the
primary consideration is to tailor and proportion the punishments so that
they will have the greatest remedial impact on the offending officer or
department.
The types of punishments that may be appropriate for offending of-
ficers would vary in severity according to the factors outlined above.
Some possible punitive measures include mandatory attendance at a
Fourth Amendment training program, a "public service" requirement,
temporary suspension, reassignment to less attractive duty, demotion,
termination of employment and traditional criminal sanctions such as
fines or incarceration.
V. CONCLUSION
With only minor modifications, adjustments, or even some U.S.
Supreme Court repositioning, the American Exclusionary Rule has sur-
vived virtually unscathed since 1961. The survival has occurred despite
clear evidence that the Rule does not accomplish that for which it was
intended. The rule does not deter future illegal police misconduct. The
original premise, that by excluding evidence the police will be suffi-
ciently censured and thereby comply with the law next time, has simply
not been the experience. Yet the rule remains the law of land, propelled
by a vacuous mission.
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Justice Blackmun taught us that the Rule is subject to change in light
of changing judicial understandings about the impact of the Rule.' 29 We
now understand that the impact of the Rule is different from that envi-
sioned in 1961; we must now get on with the serious business of change
to bring the intent and purpose of the Rule in line with reality.
The Rule is about keeping or, in some cases, bringing police conduct
into line with the Fourth Amendment. This article has set forth specific
proposals to accomplish that end. It is readily recognized that it has not
contemplated every scenario nor fully developed every notion. How-
ever, the authors acknowledge the dialogue initiated several years ago
by our colleagues, and by these proposals, hope to further that dialogue.
The integrity of the Fourth Amendment is at stake. Intellectual integrity
aside, given the public clamor generated by unparalled levels of crime
and the general dissatisfaction with the American criminal justice sys-
tem, we will be hard pressed to defend an indefensible rule.
129. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928.
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